A natural way to relate the existence theorems of Reny (1999) and Simon and Zame (1990) would be to show the following: Each game with an endogenous sharing rule satisfying the assumptions of Simon and Zame (1990) is such that the payoff correspondence has a measurable selection inducing a normalform game whose mixed extension satisfies the assumptions in Reny (1999).
Introduction
The approaches of Reny (1999) and of Simon and Zame (1990) both provide mixed strategy equilibrium existence results for general discontinuous games. While the approach of Reny (1999) means to impose certain topological conditions on players' payoff functions in the mixed extension of a given normal form game-summarized by the notion of "better reply security",-the approach of Simon and Zame (1990) replaces the vector of players' payoff function by a correspondence with certain properties and asks whether there is some measurable selection such that the induced normal form game has a mixed strategy equilibrium. As pointed out by Jackson and Swinkels (2005) , in some specific contexts such as auction settings, the two approaches seem to be closely related; however, as also pointed out by these authors, "[h]ow these approaches turn out to be related ... is an open question".
In this note we address this question. We first remark that Simon and Zame's (1990) existence result cannot be used to establish the mixed strategy equilibrium existence result of Reny (1999) . Indeed, let (X i , u i ) i=1,...,n be a normal form game such that the action sets X i are non-empty compact metric spaces and such that the mixed extension satisfies Reny's condition of better reply security.
1 Write X = n i=1 X i , and u = (u 1 , . . . , u n ). Then, if one takes for the payoff correspondence Q : X → R n the correspondence defined by setting Q(x) = {u(x)} for x ∈ X, Simon and Zame's (1990) existence result does not apply because this latter result requires Q to be closed, which need not be true because better-reply security-regardless of whether in mixed or in pure strategies-does not imply that u is continuous. If one takes for Q the smallest upper hemi-continuous closed-and convex-valued correspondence which includes u (in the sense of set inclusion of the graphs), then Simon and Zame's (1990) existence result cannot be used either, just because this result does not control the selection for which there is a mixed strategy equilibrium.
Conversely, with (X i ) i=1,...n and X as above, let Q : X → R n be a payoff correspondence which is upper hemi-continuous with non-empty compact convex values. Then, 1 See Section 2 for a formal definition.
in order that Reny's (1999) existence result can be used to establish that of Simon and Zame (1990) , one would need the existence of a measurable selection of Q that is better-reply secure in mixed strategies. This was shown to be indeed true in the setting of Carmona and Podczeck (2017) , which includes the auction setting of Jackson and Swinkels (2005) . Roughly, this setting considers games with an endogenous sharing rule such that any measurable selection of the payoff correspondence Q induces a normal-form game whose mixed extension is payoff secure. Choosing a selection of Q that maximizes the sum of players' payoffs, one finds that there exists a measurable selection with the property that the sum of its coordinates is upper semi-continuous.
In combination with Proposition 3.2 in Reny (1999) and the remarks preceding it, one may conclude that Q has a measurable selection such that the mixed extension of the induced normal-form game is better-reply secure. The same property holds in the setting considered by Barelli, Govindan, and Wilson (2014) , because, in that setting, any measurable selection of the payoff correspondence is such that sum of its coordinates is upper semi-continuous and there is at least one selection that induces a game whose mixed extension is payoff secure.
In this paper we show, however, that in a general game with an endogenous sharing rule the payoff correspondence need not have any measurable selection inducing a normal form game whose mixed extension is better-reply secure. Our result thus suggest that, in general, there is no formal relationship between the existence result of Simon and Zame (1990) and the mixed strategy existence result of Reny (1999) .
We also consider the notion of continuous security, which was introduced by Barelli and Meneghel (2013) . The mixed strategy version of this notion amounts to a condition that is weaker than the mixed strategy version of better reply security (see Barelli and Meneghel (2013, Proposition 2.4) ). Nevertheless, a similar conclusion as with better reply security is true. In fact, we show that the payoff correspondence of a game with an endogenous sharing rule need not have any measurable selection such that the mixed extension of the induced normal form game is continuously secure.
Closing the introduction, we comment on a paper by Bich and Laraki (2017) . For a normal form game (X i , u i ) i=1,...,n as above, and Q : X → R n the smallest upper hemi-continuous closed-and convex-valued correspondence which includes u = (u 1 , . . . , u n ), Bich and Laraki (2017) showed, using arguments from Simon and Zame (1990) , that there is a pair (u , σ), where u = (u 1 , . . . , u n ) is a measurable selection of Q, and σ a mixed strategy equilibrium of the normal form game (X i , u i ) i=1,...,n , such that, for each player i, the expected payoff defined from σ and u i is not smaller than the supremum of the expected payoffs that i can secure for the original payoff function u i against small deviation from σ −i by the other players. As noted by Bich and Laraki (2017) (see their Remark 4.4), this result allows for another proof of Reny's (1999) mixed strategy existence result if the mixed extension of the original game (X i , u i ) i=1,...,n is better reply secure. However, in line with our result, this does not mean that Q has any selection to which Reny's approach can be applied to show equilibrium existence.
The result
For our purposes, it suffices to consider 2-player games where each player has the closed unit interval [0, 1] as his action set. We write I = {0, 1} for the set of these players. Given i ∈ I, we write −i for I \{i}. Also, we write M for the set of Borel probability measures on [0, 1]. Thus M is the set of mixed strategies available for each of the two players. We regard M as being endowed with the narrow topology, 2 and M × M with the corresponding product topology.
In the context specified in the previous paragraph, a normal form game is fully determined by a bounded measurable function u = (u 1 , u 2 ) :
Given a normal form game u : expected payoff of player i.
A mixed strategy Nash equilibrium of the game u is a pair (
for each i ∈ I and each σ i ∈ M . Of course, this is equivalent to saying that (σ 1 , σ 2 ) is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium of the mixed extensionū of u.
Let u be a normal form game, with mixed extensionū. We say that u is mixedstrategy-better-reply secure if whenever (σ 1 , σ 2 , r 1 , r 2 ) ∈ M × M × R 2 is a cluster point of the graph ofū such that (σ 1 , σ 2 ) is not a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium of u,
there is an i ∈ I, a number α > r i , aσ i ∈ M , and a neighborhood V of σ −i in M such
In other words, this amounts to the requirement that the mixed extensionū of u be better-reply secure.
We say that u is mixed-strategy-continuously secure if whenever (
is not a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium, there is an α ∈ R 2 , a neighborhood V of (σ 1 , σ 2 ) in M × M , and a closed nonempty-valued correspondence
In other words, this amounts to the requirement that the mixed extensionū of u be continuously secure. Theorem. There is a bounded measurable function u
no u ∈ S Q u * is mixed-strategy-better-reply secure. The function u * can be chosen in such a way that, in fact, no u ∈ S Qū is mixed-strategy-continuously secure.
Remark. As noted in the introduction, mixed-strategy-continuous security implies mixed-strategy-better-reply security. Thus the formulation of our result contains some redundancy. We have chosen this formulation to point to the fact-see our proof below-that the conclusion concerning mixed-strategy-better-reply security can be established directly.
Proof of the theorem
In the sequel, "equilibrium" means "mixed strategy Nash equilibrium." For each i ∈ N and each x i ∈ [0, 1], we write δ x i for the Dirac measure at x i . Also, we write
and S 2 = {(x 1 , x 2 ) ∈ X : x 1 ≤ 1/4 and x 1 ≤ x 2 ≤ 2x 1 }.
Fix any u ∈ S Q u * . Assume first that u is such that (δ 0 , δ 1 ) is an equilibrium of u.
Because u(0, 1) = (0, 0) and u(0, 0) = (2λ, 2λ) for some λ ∈ [0, 1], it follows that u(0, 0) = (0, 0). Since u(1, 0) = (1, 1), it follows that (δ 0 , δ 0 ) is not a equilibrium of u. Note that (δ 0 , δ 0 , 2, 2) is a cluster point of the graph ofū and that for each
Thus, no player can secure a payoff strictly above 2 at (δ 0 , δ 0 ). Hence, u is not mixed-strategy-better-reply secure if u is such that (δ 0 , δ 1 ) is an equilibrium of u.
Assume now that u is such that (δ 0 , δ 1 ) is not an equilibrium of u. Note that (δ 0 , δ 1 , 0, 0) is a cluster point of the graph ofū. We show that no player can secure a payoff strictly above 0 at (δ 0 , δ 1 ). For player 1 this is true because u 1 (x ) = 0 for all
x ∈ X such that x 2 > 1/3, so thatū 1 (σ 1 , δ x 2 ) = 0 for all σ 1 ∈ M and x 2 > 1/3. As for player 2, let ε, δ > 0 and σ 2 ∈ M be given. We claim that there exists x 1 ∈ X 1 such that x 1 ≤ δ/2 (which implies that the Prohorov distance between δ x 1 and δ 0 is less than δ) andū 2 (δ x 1 , σ 2 ) < ε. To prove this claim, let ξ = min{δ/2, 1/6} and define a sequence {α t } ∞ t=0 in [0, 1] by setting α t = ξ/2 t for all t ∈ N. For all t ∈ N let
{α t }) ≤ 1, it follows that both {t ∈ N : σ 2 (O t ) ≥ ε/6} and {t ∈ N : σ 2 ({α t }) ≥ ε/6} are finite.
Thus there exists t ∈ N such that σ 2 ({α t }) < ε/6, σ 2 ({α t+1 }) < ε/6 and σ 2 (O t ) < ε/6. This implies that σ 2 (F t ) < ε/2, so thatq 2 (δ αt , σ 2 ) ≤ 2σ 2 (F t ) < ε. Furthermore, α t ≤ δ/2. Thus, letting x 1 = α t , it follows that for each ε, δ > 0 and σ 2 ∈ M 2 , there exists x 1 ≤ δ/2 such thatq 2 (δ x 1 , σ 2 ) < ε. As ε > 0 is arbitrary, it follows that player 2, too, cannot secure a payoff strictly above 0 at (δ 0 , δ 1 ). Thus, no player can secure a payoff strictly above 0 at (δ 0 , δ 1 ), and we conclude that u is not mixed-strategy-betterreply secure also in case (δ 0 , δ 1 ) is not an equilibrium of u. As u is an arbitrary element of S Q u * it follows that no element of S Q u * is mixed-strategy-better-reply secure.
We now modify the functions u * by changing the definition of the set S 2 . Let A denote the set of even natural numbers that are greater or equal than 6, and for each
Let S 2 = n∈A S n 2 . The remaining elements in the above definition of u are kept unchanged. As above, we have Q u * (0, 0) = {(2λ, 2λ) : λ ∈ [0, 1]}, Q u * (1, 0) = {(1, 1)}, and Q u * (1, 1) = Q u * (0, 1) = {(0, 0)}. Fix any u ∈ S Q u * .
To see that u is not mixed-strategy-continuously secure, assume first that u is such that (δ 0 , δ 1 ) is an equilibrium of u. As above, this implies that (δ 0 , δ 0 ) is not an equilibrium of u. Suppose that u is mixed-strategy-continuously secure. Then, in particular, there is an α ∈ R
2 , an open neighborhood V ⊆ M × M of (δ 0 , δ 0 ), and nonempty-valued closed correspondences ϕ i : V → X i for each i ∈ I, such that conditions (a) and (b) in the definition of continuous security hold. Let (x 1 , x 2 ) ∈ X be such that (δ x 1 , δ x 2 ) ∈ V , x 1 < x 2 < 2x 1 and x 1 ∈ (1/(n + 1), 1/n) for some n ∈ A. Then x belongs to the interior of S n 2 , so u(x ) = (2, 2). Condition (b) in the definition of mixed-strategy-continuous security therefore implies that α i > 2 for some i ∈ I. This, however, implies that condition (a) in the definition of continuous security cannot hold because u i (x i , x −i ) ≤ 2 for allx i ∈ [0, 1] and all i ∈ I. This contradiction shows that u is not mixed-strategy-continuously secure. Now assume that u is such that (δ 0 , δ 1 ) is not an equilibrium of u. Again suppose that u is continuously secure. Then there exists α ∈ R
2 , an open neighborhood V ⊆ M × M of (δ 0 , δ 1 ), and closed nonempty-valued correspondences ϕ i : V → M i for each i ∈ I, such that conditions (a) and (b) in the definition of continuous security hold. Let x ∈ X be such that (δ x 1 , δ x 2 ) ∈ V , x 1 ∈ (1/(n+1), 1/n) for some odd n ≥ 6 (i.e. n ∈ A c ), and x 2 > 1/3. Then u 1 (y 1 , x 2 ) = 0 for all y 1 ∈ [0, 1] and u 2 (x 1 , y 2 ) = 0 for all y 2 ∈ [0, 1]. This, together with condition (a) in the definition of continuous security, implies that α i ≤ 0 for each i ∈ I. But then {γ i ∈ M :ū i (γ i , δ x −i ) ≥ α i } = M for each i ∈ I, and condition (b) in the definition of continuous security fails. This contradiction shows that u is not mixed-strategy-continuously secure also if (δ 0 , δ 1 ) is not an equilibrium of u.
